The deposit is estimated to contain about 22,000 tonnes U3O8 (indicated plus inferred).

The Westmoreland deposit was discovered by Mount Isa Mines in 1956 and has had a long history of exploration. Most recently it was held by Rio Tinto Exploration from 1990 until 2000. It is now owned by Canadian company Laramide Resources Ltd, which purchased the lease in 2004 for US$150,000 plus some Laramide shares.

As at May 2012, the Queensland Liberal National Party government has maintained the previous state Labor government policy of banning uranium mining.

More information:

• FoE Brisbane, 2006, ‘Uranium Mining in Queensland’, http://foe.org.au/sites/default/files/Qld.pdf
• http://web.archive.org/web/20060622155716/http://www.sea-us.org.au/no-way/westmoreland.html
• http://www.laramide.com/index.php/projects22/australia10/westmoreland
• http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Australia_Mines/pmines.html#westmor

Valhalla’s total measured plus indicated resources are 28,778 tonnes U3O8 and the inferred resource is 5,824 tonnes U3O8.

As at May 2012, the Queensland Liberal National Party government has maintained previous state government policy of banning uranium mining.

In May 2012, Mount Isa’s mayor-elect Tony McGrady was lobbying for a change of state government policy. Mr McGrady, a former mines and energy minister, denied any conflict of interest despite being on the boards of two uranium mining companies − Laramide Resources, which owned the Westmoreland deposit on the Queensland/NT border, and Alligator Energy, with interests in the NT.

More information:

• http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Australia_Mines/pmines.html
• http://www.paladinenergy.com.au/default.aspx?MenuID=35
• http://www.paladinenergy.com.au/default.aspx?MenuID=78
• http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/queensland/mayor-wants-mount-isa-to-be-uranium-hub-20120501-1xwqh.html

[This webpage last updated May 2012]

The deposit was discovered in July 1954 by prospectors from nearby Mount Isa, soon after the discovery of the nearby Skal deposit sent hundreds of prospectors madly roaming the Mt Isa and Clonclurry countryside.

A sales contract with the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority was signed in 1956 (for weapons or power or both?). Mining commenced at the end of 1956 and the treatment plant was commissioned in June 1958. The project was developed by Mary Kathleen Uranium Ltd (MKU) at a cost of $24 million.

Over the years various attempts were made to find markets for the rare earths as a co-product, to no avail.

The mine was closed for more than a decade. New contracts with utilities in Japan, Germany and USA for 4,740 tonnes of uranium oxide were negotiated early in the 1970s and recommissioning began in 1974. The Commonwealth Government, through the Australian Atomic Energy Commission, underwrote this, thereby obtaining a 42% holding in the company. Conzinc Riotinto of Australia Limited, a successor of Rio Tinto Mining, held 51%, and the public 7%.

A 2009 article in the Courier Mail states: “Anti-uranium activists from Townsville held up the first, secret rail shipment of 130 tonnes of U308 from the revived mine for an hour [in 1976], the Australian Council of Trade Unions called for a ban on exports, and the Seamen’s Union organised a blockade. Not only that, the mine’s owners were forced to pay $34 million compensation to Westinghouse, which used Australian uranium in its power plants, after the Friends of the Earth green group was handed documents showing evidence of a uranium cartel. But the most extraordinary revelation came in 1980, when two tonnes of yellowcake was stolen and later found in Sydney. The company downplayed the incident, likening it to an employee stealing office stationery!”

In the mid-1970s documents were leaked to Friends of the Earth revealing:

• shoddy environmental practices at Mary Kathleen;
• close surveillance of environmental organisations;
• the close relationship between the most senior ranking Australian trade union official, ACTU President Bob Hawke, and the chairman of Conzinc Riotinto Australia (CRA), Sir Roderick Carnegie; and
• the complicity of Australian government officials in providing advice to mining companies on how to avoid important nuclear non-proliferation safeguards treaties to sell uranium to places like Taiwan (which was not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) via “Toll Processing” in the US.

At the end of 1982 the mine was depleted and finally closed down after 4,802 tonnes of uranium oxide concentrate had been produced in its second phase of operation.

One million litres of radioactive liquid was deliberately released in February 1984 from the mines evaporation ponds during an unexpectedly wet wet season.

Mary Kathleen then became the site of Australia’s first major rehabilitation project of a uranium mine, which was completed at the end of 1985 at a cost of $19 million. The mining company covered the tailings with crushed rock instead of clay in order to save millions of dollars. The seepage of radioactive radium and thorium and toxic elements from the tailings has been much greater than if clay was used as an relatively impermeable barrier. There is ongoing low-level uptake of heavy metals and radionuclides into vegetation.

More information:

• Brendan O’Malley, 10 August 2009, ‘Mary K reigned in the days before no nukes were good nukes’, http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/features/mary-k-reigned-before-no-nukes-were-good-nukes/story-e6freoro-1225759866462
• B. G. Lottermoser, P. M. Ashley, M. T. Costelloe, 2005, ‘Contaminant dispersion at the rehabilitated Mary Kathleen uranium mine, Australia’, Environ Geol (2005) 48: 748–761, http://www.springerlink.com/index/k57703154u187353.pdf
• http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mary_Kathleen,_Queensland
• http://web.archive.org/web/20060516154044/http://www.sea-us.org.au/oldmines/marykathleen.html
• Collection of photos posted at http://web.archive.org/web/20060722082707/http://www.sea-us.org.au/oldmines/maryk-hmmm.html

[This webpage last updated in May 2012.]

As at May 2012, Mega Uranium was undertaking prefeasibility studies with a view to determining the project economics, the preferred mining and processing options and the key steps in mine development. The recently-elected Liberal National Party state government has thus far maintained previous government policy of banning uranium mining, but Mega Uranium is betting on a change of policy.

The deposit was discovered in 1975 by the French company Pechiney, then explored and evaluated in detail between 1976 and 1982 by associated companies Total Mining and Minatome. In addition to problems with the Queensland state government, plans to mine Ben Lomond came unstuck because of federal Labor’s ‘three uranium mine’s’ policy from 1983 onwards.

Far-right pro-uranium federal MP Bob Katter had this to say in Parliament on 1 November 2005:

“I present a serious note of warning to the House. Of the people in North Queensland that I represent, some 50,000 or 60,000 live on the watershed of the Burdekin River and draw their water from there. The honourable member for Herbert and the honourable member for Dawson are from there. The Burdekin Falls Dam provides water for some 210,000 people. These people are drinking water that comes from the lower reaches of the Burdekin River. The Ben Lomond uranium mine, 40 or 50 kilometres from Townsville, stands right above it. A French company—I think it was Aquitaine—proposed the development of that mine. I was very positive about it. I had been brought up and lived in Cloncurry, my hometown, beside Mary Kathleen. I knew all the people who lived there. I played football there. I went to church there. I did hundreds of things there. We had no evidence that indicated uranium mining was dangerous. Some greenies living up there—not a race of people that I like in any way, shape or form; but in those days there were some sensible people associated with them—started making a noise that there had been a spill of high-level radiation.

Whilst I have waxed lyrical about the dangers of uranium not being great, there is a limit to the dangers we will accept. In the case of Ben Lomond, the company said that there had been no spill. The government agency—the forebears of what we now call the Environmental Protection Agency—also said that there had been no spill. That was for the first three or four weeks. When further evidence was disclosed, they said, firstly, that there had been a spill but the level of radiation was not dangerous and, secondly, that it had not reached the water system from which 210,000 people drank.

For the next two or three weeks they held out with that story. Further evidence was produced in which they admitted that it had been a dangerous level. Yes, it was about 10,000 times higher than what the health agencies in Australia regarded as an acceptable level. After six weeks, we got rid of lie number 2. I think it was at about week 8 or week 12 when, as a state member of parliament, I insisted upon going up to the site. Just before I went up to the site, the company admitted—remember, it was not just the company but also the agency set up by the government to protect us who were telling lies—that the spill had reached the creek which ran into the Burdekin River, which provided the drinking water for 210,000 people. We had been told three sets of lies over a period of three months.

So I say to the people of the Northern Territory: make sure that ordinary people have some sort of oversighting mechanism. Do not leave it up to the government or its officials. They will dance to the tune played by whatever piper is in charge money-wise or politically. They will not answer to the tune of protecting the people. That has been my experience.

The case of Ben Lomond was notorious, and the very development oriented Bjelke-Petersen government said no to Ben Lomond. The most development oriented government in recent Australian history said no because of the absolutely outrageous performance of their own regulatory body, as well as the mine itself. One other humorous aspect, which was not really humorous at all, was when I asked the regulatory authority chief, ‘How do you get your water samples?’ He said, ‘We have them collected.’ I said, ‘Who do you have collect them?’ He said, without any guile, ‘The company.’ So we had the company protecting itself, not the people of Queensland or the people who were depending upon this water for their water supply.”

Mudd provides a fascinating history of the attempted development of the mine from the 1970s onwards. A few highlights and lowlights from that history:

• The Queensland government’s eagerness to get the mine underway hinged on plans to site a uranium enrichment plant in Townsville − one proposal for which, at an estimated A$1000 million, came from Minatome in October 1979.
• Officially the Minatome lease was granted in early 1980 but, a year previously, the state Minister for Mines, Energy and Police, Ron Camm, announced that the mine would be given a quick go-ahead, in a statement made well in advance of completion of an Environmental Impact Study (EIS).
• Not only did the state government refuse to consult with the Townsville City Council and local shires (authorities), it also altered the Mining Act, thus allowing its Mines Department to over-rule local authorities, and it doctored procedures for conducting EIS’s − by dropping the term “Environmental” from the rules.
• Local surveys showed a majority of residents opposed to the project; and there had already been an anti-uranium march, in spite of the state’s draconic ban on all such demonstrations.
• From this point on, opposition mounted dramatically. The Australian Telecommunications Employees Association in February 1981 imposed communications bans on Minatome. The Movement Against Uranium Mining (MAUM) also announced a “tent village” at Ben Lomond, to be held that summer.
• The opponents’ case depended not only on previous experience in the uranium industry, but Minatome’s existing practice at the mine site. The Queensland Campaign Against Nuclear Power claimed that: “Already a level of radioactivity two and a half times the legally permitted level has been recorded in a creek which flows into the river. This was from a stockpile of 3500 tonnes. When the mine is in operation, the stockpile will be two and a half million tonnes.”
• Neil Heinze, a local civil engineer, claimed that radioactive leakage was “certain” to occur from the site, while all artificial methods of containment were inadequate. Professor Frank Stacey, Professor of Applied Physics at the University of Queensland, predicted that inevitable radioactive leaking would pollute the Burdekin river system, especially as the proposed dam across the river would “ensure that heavy pollutants tend to accumulate in the reservoir and any area in which water from the reservoir is used, instead of being flushed out to sea”.
• The Queensland Mining Warden rejected Minatome’s application based on environmental considerations. He found that there was no proper long-term arrangement for the containment of tailings. He questioned the appropriateness of clay as a liner for the evaporation ponds and tailings dumps.
• The Queensland Mines Minister, Ivan Gibbs, sought to overturn the Warden’s decision. By this time, another scandal was in the news. The national newsmagazine, National Times, revealed that Minatome had destroyed several vital Aboriginal sites “in the past couple of months” − including one possibly some 4000 years old, “considered to be one of the most significant in North Queensland”. This site was bulldozed by the company to make way for an experimental evaporation pond.
• Another Aboriginal quarry site “considered to be unique in Australia” was also under threat by planned high-tension power lines and water pipes, while a sacred pool was threatened by nearby drilling. A confidential document obtained by the National Times revealed that Minatome had been aware of these Aboriginal sites since 1978 and was advised in an archaeological impact statement that they should be protected.
• Early the next year, Minatome flew out 36 tonnes of uranium ore from Ben Lomond to Noumea in New Caledonia, then on to France. The flight was organised to evade union bans at Townsville, as well as adverse publicity.
• A few months later, the World Bike Ride − antinuclear activists who had set out from Melbourne in March − set up an “Atom-Free” embassy at the mine site itself.
• Then, in mid-1983, the federal Australian government banned all uranium exports to France, in retaliation for France’s continued nuclear testing in the Pacific. In response, the company reportedly filled in the tailings dam and development work came to a halt.
• At the end of the year, the company finally published the environmental impact statement − a few days after the ALP government announced a ban on all new uranium mines, apart from Olympic Dam.
• Early in 1986 it was reported in the Australian Senate that the uranium ore stockpiled at Ben Lomond had been virtually abandoned, with a minimum of security precautions.

More information:

• Mega Uranium: http://www.megauranium.com/properties/australia/ben_lomond/
• http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Australia_Mines/pmines.html
• Dr Gavin Mudd: http://web.archive.org/web/20060621235454/http://www.sea-us.org.au/no-way/benlomond.html
• Minatome, March 1983, Ben Lomond Project − Draft Environmental Impact Statement, Brisbane, Qld, Vol 1 and 2.

[This webpage last updated May 2012.]

Irradiation changes food in ways that have not been adequately tested for safety. Irradiation depletes food or vitamins and causes the formation of “radiolytic products” whose effect on human health is not known.

In 2009 the irradiation of cat food was banned in Australia after nearly one hundred cats became ill and many died. This has prompted many pet food companies to review their policies regarding irradiation, recognising pet health concerns. The Australian government has yet to recognise that similar risks exist for human health.

Under Australian law, pet food, animal feed, therapeutic goods and complimentary medicines are not classified as “food”.  These products can, therefore be irradiated with no labelling requirements. Many of these products are packaged and sold in similar manner and on the same retailer shelves as products that are classified as “food”. Consumers have no way to discern that the products fall under different regulatory bodies and therefore have differing labelling requirements.

More information: http://foodirradiationwatch.org

[This webpage last updated March 2012]

All of the four uranium mining proposals currently under assessment in WA appear to reply upon a proposal to establish a transfer facility in Parkeston, which would be built for the purpose of storing, handling and transferring uranium concentrate. Uranium would be transferred from truck to rail on route to ports in South Australia and the Northern Territory.

A uranium transfer facility at Parkeston represents a serious public interest issue, due to the radioactive nature of the material being transported and stored, and the close proximity to permanent housing. The West Australian government has been vocal about keeping uranium away from towns like Geraldton and Kalgoorlie but is ignoring the community at Ninga Mia.

While there has been public acknowledgement of this proposal from the WA Minister for Mines and Petroleum, there is no public documentation indicating who the proponent for the facility is, the status of this facility, or any other details. It appears that the Government is proposing to use ‘Roylaties for Regions’ money to fund the project.

 [This webpage last updated April 2012.]

Energy Minerals Australia won a court battle over ownership of the deposit and plans to accelerate exploration activities. The local community of Coonana have a long experience with the nuclear industry − many migrated to Cundalee and then Coonana from SA during and after the Maralinga nuclear weapons tests in the 1950s. Energy Minerals Australia has several other uranium deposits close to Mulga Rocks that it is exploring including Narnoo, Gunbarrel and Mingwal.

More information:

• Energy Minerals Australia www.eama.com.au/projects/mulga

[This webpage last updated April 2012]

Cameco and Mitsubishi are conducting exploration mining, they are in discussions with Martu Traditional Owners about the project and are having logistical problems with roads and access to the site to do important studies. Cameco has submitted a Scoping Document to the WA EPA which has been approved, but is behind schedule with its Environmental Review Management Plan.

The Martu have at different times expressed serious opposition to the proposed mine at Kintyre. In 1988 two Traditional Owners travelled to London to the Annual General Meeting of RTZ (now known as Rio Tinto, formerly RTZ-CRA) to express their concerns that uranium mining would destroy traditional lifestyles and pose a threat to sacred sites and sites of significance.

Kintyre is in an area that has been excised from the Karlamilyi (formerly Rudall River) National Park. Several other uranium mining companies are buying up tenements close to Kintyre in the hope of finding uranium seams of the main Kintyre deposit − including companies such as Mega Uranium and Encounter Resources / Barrick Gold.

Cameco estimates that the mine will use 1.5 megalitres of water per day − over 500 megalitres annually.

Estimates based on company data suggest some 25 million tonnes of liquid wastes will be generated. The presence of such materials poses significant environmental problems. The area around the Kintyre site is both arid and fragile. Water is extremely scarce. The constant extraction from subterranean aquifers may have a severe impact. The problems of the storage, treatment and management of mine waste waters are also significant and provide a pathway for environmental degradation.

More information:

• CCWA submission on the Kintyre Scoping Document http://ccwa.org.au/sites/default/files/FINAL_Kintyre_Scoping_Submission_CCWA_ACF_TWS_ACF.doc
• Cameco http://www.cameco.com/exploration/major_projects/australia/kintyre
• Historical information: http://web.archive.org/web/20060620110330/http://www.sea-us.org.au/no-way/kintyre.html

[This webpage last updated April 2012.]

More information:

• Submission on Scoping study of Lake Maitland by Mega uranium http://ccwa.org.au/sites/default/files/CCWA_ACF_TWS_Lake%20Maitland_U_Mine_Mega.doc
•  Mega Uranium http://www.megauranium.com/properties/australia/lake_maitland/
• Scoping document http://www.epa.wa.gov.au/docs/3212_LakeMaitland_ESD_15062.pdf

[This webpage last updated April 2012.]

BHP Billiton concluded one stage of exploration mining. A Scoping Document was approved by the WA EPA in early 2010 but BHP Billiton has not (as yet) prepared an Environmental Review and Management Programme for EPA approval. It appears the project is ‘on ice’. Staff and senior management from the Yeelirrie project have been relocated to other areas of BHP Billiton. The Wongutha Traditional Owners have directed the Central Desert Native Title Service to no longer negotiate or discuss uranium mining with BHP Billiton in an act of opposition and dissent to any plans to mine uranium.

In the 1980s, WMC dug a series of trial mines at the Yeelirrie site. This was the first large scale calcrete ore-body found in the world, and thus no exploration techniques were known in order to accurately determine ore reserves and develop the feasibility study for a commercial mine. The trial mining involved several pits, extracting a total of more than 130,000 tonnes of ore. The pilot processing plant was in Kalgoorlie, although the tailings were dumped back at the mine site, in several dams. The exact production of uranium is unknown, although given the amount of ore mined, it was probably around 195 tonnes U₃O₈. It was most likely shipped to the Olympic Dam uranium mine in the late 1980s and then mixed in to production and sold.

No progress was made from 1983−96 when the federal Labor government banned new uranium mines. In its 1996 Environment Progress Report, released in July 1997, WMC admitted leaving a contaminated trial uranium mine exposed to the public, with inadequate fencing and warning signs, for more than 10 years. A spokesperson for WMC said a 1995 inspection revealed the problems and also admitted that the company could have known about the problems as early as 1992.

WMC said there was inadequate signage warning against swimming in a dam at the site, which was found to be about 30 times above World Health Organisation radiation safety standards and admitted that people used the dam for “recreational” purposes including swimming, but did not drink the salty water.

WMC said it had “no record of whether uranium ore or contaminated products inside the exposed drums were removed”. However, a further 1996 inspection revealed that “uranium ore from the site was also found to have been used to repair nearby roads”.

More information:

• Submission to the EPA on the Scoping study by BHP for Yeelirrie http://ccwa.org.au/sites/default/files/100222-BHP%20Billiton%20Yeelirrie%20ESD%20submission.doc
• Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yeelirrie_uranium_project
• Historical information: http://web.archive.org/web/20060622155638/http://www.sea-us.org.au/no-way/yeelirrie.html
• ‘WMC Admits Leaving Uranium Mine Exposed’, The Age, 10/7/97
• ‘BHP bosses grilled at AGM in Perth’, 16/11/10, www.perthnow.com.au/business/news/bhp-bosses-grilled-at-agm-in-perth/story-e6frg2qu-1225954576279

Above and below – trial mining at Yeelirrie

[This webpage last updated April 2012]